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Abstract. Online banking services have been fighting malware for the last 10 
years. However, the emergence of targeted Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) banking 
malware has given the upper hand to attackers in this fight. MitB Trojans hook 
themselves into end users browsers, intercept their banking credentials, alter 
their transaction details, and then transparently alter the HTML of the bank web 
pages they are viewing. The end user then approves the transaction 
unsuspectingly. MitB is able to evade traditional defense mechanisms such as 
intrusion detection systems, anti-fraud policies, as well as strong authentication 
mechanisms. In this paper, we present a solution aimed at detecting and 
preventing MitB attacks. The solutions rely on concepts related to the trusted 
computing paradigm. It defines a trusted path in the end user platform, which 
allows it to take a screen-capture of the displayed transaction details displayed 
by the end users screen, and forward it in the same TLS session as the 
transaction details to the bank. The trusted path is hardware-protected by the 
TPM, and ensures that the screen-capture has not been altered by any 
malware. The solution also relies on the TPM PKI in order to give assurance to 
the bank that the screen-capture originates form a genuine user. The solution is 
aimed at corporate end users and industries. 
 
1 Introduction And Motivation 
 
Our ambition to build an interconnected modern information society has exposed us to a new 
vector of threats, which is that of cybercrime. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
reports that we are witnessing a decline in physical crimes, such as bank robberies, as opposed 
to an increasing rate of cybercrime [1].  Because cybercriminals are often motivated by 
monetary rewards, financial and banking institutions are one of their main targets [2]. 
Financial institutions have been fighting malware that targets online banking for over ten years 
[3]. However, one can observe that financial Trojans are only getting more flexible and 
advanced. One of their latest advances is the Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) Trojan attack, which 
will be the focus of this paper. What makes MitB attacks popular is the ease by which they can 
be deployed to many systems at once, via phishing links, botnets and through compromising 
legitimate sites [4]. What makes them dangerous is their ability to go beyond a traditional 
Man-In-The- Middle attack: Instead of just intercepting or piggybacking traffic via a proxy 
page, MitB attacks fully take over a user’s view of a website, and control the browser in an 
effort to trick the user into thinking that everything is normal while the attack is being 
executed. By slightly altering the HTML of banking websites, attackers can steal money 
without a user’s knowledge. Once the user logs in, MitB Trojans can also redirect any 
sensitive traffic to an attacker’s system, while leaving the TLS/SSL communication 
protections intact [4], [5].Traditionally, malware has been guarded against in one of two ways: 
  
 Defense mechanisms aimed at preventing the end user platform from getting 
compromised: mainly through end point intrusion detection systems. 
 Defense mechanisms aimed at preventing the malware (once I has infected the 
end users’ platform) from conducting the attack, mainly through defining and 
implementing anti-fraud policies, that are induced from intelligent data analysis 
of past fraudulent behavior. 
 
We believe that one of the reasons why these defense mechanisms are inefficient, is 
because they are trying to solve all MitB attack scenarios at once. This stands in sharp 
contrast to how MitB attacks are conceived. According to the 2015 RSA Cybercrime 
report, there are 4 main new trends that are changing the threat landscape. One of these 
main trends is that threats continue to grow more targeted and mode advanced [2]. 
Motivated by this trend, the present paper focuses on a specific use case. The targeted 
users of our solution are enterprise employees, mainly in the finance and banking sectors, 
who are bound by their corporate policies to perform all work related tasks from a 
specific machine that is owned and managed by the firm. We think this does not hinder the 
usefulness of the solution, as corporate users are the most vulnerable target of MitB attacks. 
Indeed, the criminal community is heavily focusing its attacks today on corporate- banking 
customers, as the available funds are often greater, transaction limits are higher and the 
corporate customer has access to a wire transfer or Automated Clearing House (ACH) 
services through the online banking interface [6]. However, the solution is also relevant 
for the end-user market, which would only require service providers to keep track of 
platforms used by their customers. The solutions has no restriction on which browser is 
being used. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first  explain  the  workings  of  
the  Man-In-The-Browser  attack.  The literature review introduces previously proposed 
solutions as well as their shortcomings. Subsequently, we explain the architecture as well as 
the technical details of our solution. Finally, the paper closes with a discussion and a set 
of conclusions, as well as an overview of the expected future work. 
 
2 Man-In-The-Browser (MITB) 
 
2.1 Technical Overview 
 
The idea of MitB attacks was first presented by Agusto Paes de Barros in 2005. By 2007, 
financial fraud Trojans was already using it against end users. MitB spreads through Trojan 
malware. It takes the form of an application hooked into the browser [3]. It defines a new 
breed of attacks whose primary objective is to spy on browser sessions (mostly banking), 
and in that process intercepts and transparently modifies the HTML of the web page being 
viewed by the end user. In a classic MitB attack, it is very likely that what the user is seeing 
on his/her browser window is not something which the actual server sent. Similarly, what 
the server receives on the other end might not be what the user intended to send. MitB attacks 
happen at the presentation layer. Since browsers have high level privileges on a system, if an 
attacker  is able to execute a process through the browser, then that process can be executed 
with high level privileges [7]. More specifically, MitB malware mostly leverages browser 
 extensions in order to exploit the operating system. Browser extensions are typically used 
to enhance users’ experience within the browser while surfing the Internet. Browser 
extensions and features to which the Trojan hooks can include [4]: 
 Plugins, 
 Browser Helper Objects (BHO), 
 JavaScript, 
 Add-on features, 
 Ajax calls, 
 Browser API Hooking, 
 DOM Object models. 
 
For the sake of brevity, we will not explain how the Trojan attaches itself to each one of 
the above mentioned browser add-ons and/or features. Once a MitB Trojan has infected 
the machine and hooked itself to the browser, it can be controlled via a configuration file 
or a web injection file, which is updated  at certain time intervals as part of a botnet. These 
configuration files may be obfuscated with different types of encoding. The configuration 
file and web injection file allow an attacker to control sessions and inject custom code 
into HTTP traffic. They also allow the Trojan to run when certain websites are visited 
such as banking institutions. MitB attacks can also erase traces of its actions from the 
browser’s history, including  cookies [4]. 
A successful MitB attack can show the user a completely consistent picture of the 
transaction he or she is executing, while actually executing a totally different transaction 
with their bank. Transaction details may be modified or totally unrelated transactions may 
be launched, all without the user or the bank ever understanding that an attack is underway 
[6]. 
All MitB attacks have two main phases: infection, and transaction takeover. The first 
phase can happen through phishing or browser vulnerabilities. An example of the second 
phase, can have the structure illustrated in Table II-A. MitB attacks have proven to be a very 
effective form of   attack. In a documented attack against a German bank in 2011 the 
following has been reported: from 11 August until 26 August, the cyber gang stole a total 
of EUR 193,606, or about EUR 12,000 per day. From 30 August at 15:50h until 1 
September at 11.48h, they stole a total of EUR 42,527, or about EUR 21,000 per day. There 
was a gap in their cybercrime activities of four days. If we include this gap, we see that the 
cyber gang made an estimated total of around EUR 300,000 in just 22 days. The longer 
the Trojan remains active, the more money is it able to steal for this cyber gang. On an 
annual basis, this cyber gang could make close to EUR 5 Million. Or US$ 7.3 Million 
annually [8]. 
 
3 Proposed Solutions And Their Shortcomings 
 
Given the danger posed by Man-In-The-Browser attacks, a number of solutions have been 
proposed for their detection and prevention. In this section, we explore these defenses, as 
well as why they are failing to protect end users from MitB attacks. 
 Many   banks   have   been   proposing   solutions that would strengthen their 
authentication mechanism. These solutions range from  two-factor authentication, 
biometrics Grid cards, OTP tokens and out of band OTPs. All of these defense 
 mechanisms can be bypassed by MitB malware, as it can intercept or wait until the user 
is past these challenges before taking over [6], [9]. 
 Network defenses such as web application firewalls, IDS and IPS systems have 
difficulty detecting this attack since it occurs locally on the client side. Furthermore, 
while decrypting TLS banking sessions may be a solution, this is not practical as it 
poses a big breach to user’s privacy [4]. 
 Preventing browser extensions and scripting has been proposed as a solution to 
mitigate MitB attacks, or preventing scripts to run over TLS connections. There are 
available methods to restrict browser extensions from running, but this means that 
certain websites may not operate properly, and restricting browsers is difficult in 
today’s age of multimedia operations [4]. 
 Geo-location,  which  is  Based  on  the  end-users  computer  IP address, to determine 
the users geographic  location  and compare it to typical locations used by this user. 
While effective when credentials are stolen and used elsewhere, these techniques 
fail against MitB because the malware is in the user’s regular browser, at the user’s 
typical location. 
 
4 Proposed Solution 
 
4.1 Profile Of The Solution’s Target Audience 
 
The trusted platform module is a central piece of our proposed solution. This makes it 
bound to a specific platform. While there are no technical reasons why our solution cann ot 
be applied to all of end users, we believe that from a usability perspective, the ideal 
target audience for the deployment of this solution would be enterprise employees, mainly in 
the finance and banking sectors, who are bound by their corporate policies to perform all 
work related tasks from a specific machine, that is owned and managed by the firm. The 
solution has no restriction over which the browser is being used. We think this does not 
hinder the usefulness of the solution, as corporate  users are the most vulnerable target of 
MitB attacks. Indeed, the criminal community is heavily focusing its attacks today on 
corporate-banking customers, as the available funds are often greater, transaction limits are 
higher and the corporate customer has access to a wire transfer or Automated Clearing 
House (ACH) services through the online banking interface  [6]. 
 
4.2 Solution Design Principles 
 
This section introduces the design principles that motivate the architecture of the solution. 
The solution should not rely on end-point intrusion detection systems. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 1.  Vulnerable Workflow [4] 
 
 
 
1 The solution should not rely on end-point intrusion detection      systems. 
2 It is assumed that the end-user platform can be infected by malware, and 
thus cannot be trusted. 
3 The solution should not rely on fraud detection policies. 
4 The solution does not assume that the displayed HTML pages of banking 
transactions are in accordance with what the server is processing. 
5 The solution should provide a reliable mechanism for communicating the 
end-user’s genuinely intended trans- action to the service provider. 
6 The solution should have a trusted path that is hardware protected, in order 
to assess that the transaction the user intends to submit and execute is what 
the service provider is also receiving. 
 
Solution Requirements 
The end user platform should be equipped with a trusted  platform module that can be enabled and 
activated. 
 
4.3 Trusted Platform Modules 
 
Our research has led us to conclude that a solution centered on the trusted platform module 
would allow us to satisfy the above mentioned design principles. Thus, we would like to 
present in this section TPM concepts that are necessary for understanding the rest of the 
paper. Trusted computing is a paradigm developed and standardized by the Trusted 
Computing Group. It aims to enforce trustworthy behavior of computing platforms by 
identifying a complete chain of  trust, a list of all hardware and software that has been 
used [10]. This chain of software can then be compared to a list of known good 
 applications, unlike standard approaches such as virus scanners that try to recognize and 
eliminate bad software [11]. Trusted Platform Modules TPMs are of one of the main 
building blocks of this paradigm. TPM is defined by the TCG as a computer chip micro-
controller that is attached to the motherboard [12]. 
 
TPM Integrity Measurement and Reporting: The TPM can securely store artifacts 
(encryption keys, passwords, certificates. It can also store platform integrity 
measurements that help ensure that the platform remains trustworthy. This is possible thanks 
to the 16 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) contained in the TPM. 
A PCR is a 160 bit wide register that can hold a SHA-2 hash. Each SHA-2 hash 
corresponds to a measurement of a piece of software or hardware present on the platform. 
It is  not possible to write directly to a PCR. The only PCR allowed operation is the 
extend(x): This operation calculates the new value of a PCR as a SHA-2 hash of the 
concatenation of the old value and x [13]. By definition, the extend operation is non-
commutative, meaning that the order of events can be maintained. also, because the output of 
SHA-2 is fixed, we can store as many measurements in a sequence as we want. 
One successful application of the PCR integrity measurements has been to measure the 
boot process: The extend  operation is used to store a hash of a chain of loaded software in 
PCRs. The chain starts with the BIOS and includes Option ROMs2, Bootloader, OS and 
applications. Because the PCRs cannot be erased, this means that no program can cancel 
its execution from the TPM. The first item in the chain cannot be independently measured at 
runtime, and is referred to as the root of trust  for  measurement.  We  would  aim  for  it    to  
be  immutable  if possible. A platform is said to support authenticated boot when it 
follows this process, as it provides a way for users to authenticate their platform boot 
sequence against reference values [14], [11]. An optional follow up step to integrity 
measurements is integrity logging, which stores integrity metrics in a log for later use. 
Logging is recommended. Otherwise integrity measurements might need to be repeated in 
order to interpret PCR values. Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to integrity 
measurements  recorded in PCRs [15], [12]. 
 
TPM Attestation: The previous paragraph establishes the process by which the TPM 
measures and records the integrity of (selected) soft- ware and hardware that is running on 
the platform. Integrity measurement can be a much more useful operation if we had a 
mechanism for the TPM to report these measurements to a third party it is communicating 
with. This third party can then check if the platform configuration is known, and 
depending on policy, decide if the platform should be trusted for the transactions it wants 
to execute with that platform. This process, called attestation, is facilitated by a PKI that 
has been specifically defined for TPMs [15], [16]. The following are the parts of the TPM 
PKI that are relevant  to this paper: 
 
Endorsement key: An Endorsement Key is a special purpose TPM- resident RSA key that is 
never visible outside of the TPM. Because the EK can only be used for encryption, 
possession of the private EK can only be proved indirectly, by using it to decrypt a value 
that has been encrypted with the public EK. Therefore, while the EK cannot be used to 
produce a digital signature, it is able to provide for TPM authentication based on 
decryption  operations [17]. 
 
 Attestation Identity Key: An Attestation Identity Key is a special purpose TPM-resident RSA 
key that is used to provide platform authentication based on the attestation  capability of the 
TPM. All AIK key present on the platform are encrypted based on the Endorsement Key. 
A challenger could use this information, along with other information in the credential to 
trust the platform via an attestation protocol [18]. 
Indeed, when challenged, the TPM can create a signed copy of its PCR values. The 
signing key (attestation identity key AIK) being demonstrably linked to a trusted 
platform, with privacy protection where necessary. This is then given to the challenger for 
inspection, along with the measurement log. The software running at the platform can be 
identified by matching the hash values in the log with reference data. This requires a list of 
reference integrity measurements (RIMs) contained within a Reference Manifest Database 
[19]. These measurements are collected from their original source: the software and 
hardware manufacturers [10] 
 
4.4 Putting It All Together 
 
Top Of The Mountain View: In order for the bank to execute a money transfer, it needs to 
make sure that the amount it has received from the user was  generated and approved by him, 
and not by a MitB Trojan. In a parallel world, one way to solve this would be for the 
bank have access to the screen of the end user and check the amount being displayed 
to him against the amount it has received before executing the transaction. Given the 
impracticality of this solution, what we propose in this paper is a solution that provides 
equal guarantees, and that can be implemented by the aid of a TPM. The requirements for the 
solutions are as follows: 
1 Every time an end user is making a money transfer,  they should send a copy 
of their screen information to  the bank 
2 The end user should have a mechanism which ensures that the screenshot he 
is sending is not altered by a platform malware (MitB or not). 
 
3 The bank should have a mechanism which ensures that the screenshot has 
not been altered by MitB malware, after having been generated by a 
trustworthy platform. 
 
4 The bank should have a mechanism which ensures that he screenshot 
originates from a legitimate end-user platform. Section 4.4.2 explains how 1 
and 2 and achieved. Section 4.4.3 explains how 3 and 4 are achieved. 
 
End User Trusted Path Trusted Path: In order to take a screen capture of what is being 
displayed to the end user in a trustworthy manner, we cannot rely on a browser extension to 
do that, as we assume that the browser might be infected with a MitB Trojan. Hence, we 
need to trigger a call directly to the Graphical display driver, which would allow us to 
access directly the RAM memory space where the displayed information on the screen is 
being rendered. Furthermore, we need to ensure that neither the graphics driver nor the 
API calls have been infected by malware. In order to satisfy all of these requirements, the 
following steps should be implemented: 
 Enable and Activate the client platform. 
  Enable the authenticated boot. 
 If the authenticated boot is successful, then we are sure that the components of the 
boot process haven’t been altered by malware. hence, we can choose the graphics 
driver as our application’s root of trust, as it is part of the boot sequence that has been 
already measured. 
 A trusted path from the device driver until the RAM  memory space where the 
content displayed on the screen   should have already  been  defined.  n  a  PC  
platform,  the trusted  path sequence is as follows: 
 
1 Graphics driver. 
2 API call from the driver to the GPU RAM(referred to thereafter  API1). 
3 API call in the GPU RAM executing the driver call (referred to thereafter  as 
API2). 
4 The program code executing the screen capture (referred to thereafter as 
PROG1). 
5 The program code copying the screen capture into the TPM protected 
memory (referred to thereafter as PROG2). 
 Measure each component in the trusted path, and record the measurement value in 
the designated PCR for our solution(*MVAL= Measured Value): 
 
PCR(x)=SHA1 (SHA1 ((SHA-1( SH 1([Graphics Driver MVal*]) 
+[API1 MVal*])+[API2 MVal*])+[PROG1 MVal*])+[PROG2 MVal*]). 
 
 Compare the measured value to the reference measurement of the trusted path 
sequence. 
 If the measured value matches the reference value, then we are sure that the trusted 
path has not been infected  with malware. Hence we can proceed. 
 Following the now measured trusted path command, take back screen capture of 
the screen. 
 Copy the screen capture to a TPM protected storage memory. The sequence of 
events described above, satisfies the first band second requirements. 
 It guarantees that:1) At the moment an end-user makes a money transfer, they 
send a copy of their screen information to the bank, and 2) The end user should have a 
mechanism which ensures that the screen capture they send is not altered by 
malware. 
Bank’s Remote Attestation: Once the screen capture has been copied into a TPM protected 
storage area, the following sequence should be followed: 
 
1. The attestation Identity key pair is used to sign the screen capture. 
2. The signed screen capture is sent with the transaction details in the same 
TLS session. 
3. The bank uses the corresponding public key to verify the signature. 
4. The bank verifies that the AIK belongs to the same end user making the 
transaction (through the above  described  TPM PKI). 
5. The bank extracts the transaction amount from the end user’s screen 
capture using Optical  Character  Recognition(OCR), and compares it to the 
amount it has received in the same TLS session. 
 
 6. If the amounts match, then the bank can proceed with the transaction, 
 otherwise the bank suspends the transaction and notifies the end user. 
 
In order to match the trusted screen capture with the un- trusted transaction  data,  the  
server  must  use  OCR  (Optical     Character Recognition) to extract the transaction data 
from the received screen capture. The combination of a digitally signed screen capture with 
OCR can be considered as the Robust  WYSIWYS system [20]. Commercial and open source 
OCR software packages are available. In its simplest form, OCR software takes scanned 
documents in bitmap format, and converts them into text files. More advanced graphical 
layout of digital documents will require a standard for geometrically formatting 
documents, so that the translation from analogue bitmap format to digital document 
format is unambiguous. Since the service provider generates the HTML content, the 
service provider has full control of the graphical layout of web pages, and can adapt the 
OCR to the graphical layout of their choice. The above described message flow assumes that: 
 
1 The bank has a way to acquire the AIK public key. 
2 There is an appropriate PKI structure to verify that the signature is from a genuine 
TPM. 
3 The bank can verify that the signature belongs to the same end user. 
 
TCG (Trusted Computing Group) defines a PKI structure that satisfies the first and second 
requirements This can be achieved through the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation, that 
links the AIK to the unique endorsement key present on each TPM [16]. However, it is 
up to the end users and their corresponding bank to find a mechanism that would satisfy the 
third requirement. For the context of this paper, this can be achieved during the new 
employee’s registration phase with the bank. Indeed, in a corporate context, the platform 
a user is using is owned and managed by the corporate IT department. The IT 
department can decide on a way to communicate  to the bank the new employee’s AIK 
certificate during the registration phase (this can be done both online or out-of- band). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Solution Message Flow 
 
Now that we have explained the technical details of the solution, we will step back in 
this section, and abstract those details, in order to formulate a message flow of the end 
user/bank interactions. Table II illustrates how the proposed solution successfully detects 
the presence of a MitB Trojan of the client’s platform, as well stops the bank from 
executing its fraudulent actions. If the bank detects that the amount it has received is not 
the same one that was displayed to the end user, it can  immediately  halt  the  transaction  
and  not  go  forward  with money transfer. This action successfully neutralizes the MitB 
Trojan. The bank can also notify the corresponding client about the fact that their 
platform is infected, so appropriate measures can be taken. 
 
5 Conclusion And Future Work 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a solution aimed at detecting Man-In- The-Browser attacks, 
and preventing their execution by the bank. Because the core of this solution is the trusted 
platform module, it is mostly usable for people whose default way of doing online banking 
is through a dedicated machine. This is the case of corporate employees. This group of 
users also constitutes the main target of MitB attacks, especially within the banking and 
finance industries. Just as MitB at- tacks are growing to be more sophisticated and 
tailored to specific platforms and users, so should the solutions aimed at preventing them. 
This paper also brings forward a novel way in which TPMs can be leveraged. While 
TPMs are currently being shipped with most end user devices, their functionalities remain 
largely underutilized. This is mainly due to the lack of attractive applications that can drive 
its activation and consumption. Furthermore, most of the currently available TPM 
applications such as Microsoft Bitlocker and authenticated boot are local client centric. 
However, our proposed solution is leveraging TPM so as to increase the security at the 
web application level, linking this way a platform’s hardware to web applications. We 
believe that trusted computing, and hardware enabled computing in general, should be 
further investigated for it to become part of our defense arsenal against web threats. In line 
with this direction, our future work aims at specifying the architecture for the proposed 
solution for Windows computers and Android devices, and follow up with a prototype 
implementation for the Windows computer solution, so as it can be tested in real world 
scenarios 
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